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Tipping Points and Loss Aversion in International Environmental Agreements
Doruk İriş1, Alessandro Tavoni2

Abstract
We study the impact of loss-aversion and the threat of catastrophic damages, which
we jointly call threshold concerns, on international environmental agreements. We
aim to understand whether a threshold for dangerous climate change is as an
effective coordination device for countries to overcome the global free-riding
problem and abate sufficiently to avoid disaster. We focus on loss-averse countries
negotiating either under the threat of either high environmental damages (loss
domain), or low damages (gain domain). Under symmetry, that is when countries
display identical degrees of threshold concern, we show that such beliefs have a
positive effect on reducing the emission levels of both signatories to the treaty and
non-signatories, leading to higher global welfare and weakly larger coalitions of
signatories. We then introduce asymmetry, by allowing countries to differ in the
degree of concern about the threat of disaster. We show that stable coalitions are
mostly formed by the countries with higher threshold concern. When enough
countries having no threshold concern could cause the coalition size to diminish,
regardless of the other countries have strong or mild threshold concerns.
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1. Introduction
The theory of international environmental agreements (IEAs) has produced stark
insights into the difficulties of achieving cooperation. Due to the intrinsic trade-off
between the breadth of the agreement, as measured by the number of acceding
countries, and the depth of the abatement commitments, game theorists have
postulated that self-enforcing environmental agreements will have limited success.
Either few signatories will commit to stringent targets, or many countries will sign
on to a shallow agreement that only achieves modest reductions (Barrett, 1994;
Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; D’Aspremont, 1983; Hoel, 1992). Many extensions to
the standard model have recently enriched it to account for important empirical
findings, amongst which: introducing asymmetric countries and the possibility of
making side payments; relaxing rationality and perfect foresight assumptions
ascribed to countries; and linkage of cooperation on IEAs with other issues such as
trade and R&D (for reviews of this literature, see Barrett, 2005, and Finus, 2008).
One feature, which is common to virtually all IEA literature, is that reference
considerations are absent from countries’ welfare functions. These depend on
absolute benefits and costs of emissions in a continuous fashion.
In economics and psychology, the concept of loss aversion has recently been used to
account for the empirical finding that individuals place higher weight on losses than
gains, violating the assumption of standard economic theory that tastes are
unchanging (Kahneman, 2003). Theories of loss aversion have sprung up with
proposed explanations for this ubiquitous phenomenon, occurring in financial
markets (e.g., Benartzi & Thaler, 1995), consumption and savings patterns (e.g.,
Bowman, Minehart, & Rabin, 1999), macroeconomic policy (e.g., Ciccarone &
Marchetti, 2013), contract theory (e.g., Daido et al., 2013), real estate transactions
(e.g., Genesove & Mayer, 2001), the energy paradox (Greene, 2011), competitive
behavior (e.g., Eisenkopf & Teyssier, 2013), and trade (Freund & Ozden, 2008;
Tovar, 2009), among others.
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Remarkably, loss aversion has not, to the best of our knowledge, been used in
modeling environmental agreements.1 Given the pervasiveness of reference point
considerations in human decision-making, we investigate its role in affecting the
size and commitment level of coalitions cooperating on curbing emission levels in
the presence of loss aversion with respect to a threshold amount for acceptable
environmental damage. The premise is that there exists a “tipping point”, which is
viewed by all states as indicative of an approaching catastrophe (Tavoni and Levin,
2014). That is, nations believe that below a given tolerable amount of environmental
damage business carries on as usual, according to the standard calculus of net
benefits from pollution. But above a critical level of damage from emissions,
additional losses ensue according to a multiplier effect.
The literature on environmental tipping points and disastrous climate change has
recently focused on such boundary conditions, which if crossed may trigger quick
and unavoidable ecosystem collapse (Scheffer et al., 2001; Lade et al., 2013).
Rockström and colleagues (Rockström et al., 2009) have identified planetary
boundaries that define “the safe operating space for humanity with respect to the
Earth system and are associated with the planet’s biophysical subsystems or
processes.” They suggest that the boundaries in three systems, including climate
change (for which they propose to keep atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration
below 350 parts per million and the change in radiative forcing below one watt per
square meter), have already been crossed. Hence, the prospect of incurring
additional losses from ecosystem collapse may well enter into governments’
considerations. This will be particularly likely for vulnerable developing countries
with limited capability to adapt to the changing climate, for instance those that are
located on coastal areas and are prone to flooding.

1

One exception is İriş (2016). It examines the implications of political parties being averse
to insufficient economic performance (relative to a critical economic target level) on
sustaining an international environmental agreement in an infinitely repeated game setting.
Other widely used behavioral concepts that have been incorporated into IEAs are
reciprocity (Hadjiyiannis et al., 2012; Nyborg, 2015) and inequity-aversion (Lange, 2006).
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In this paper we concentrate on the implications (in terms of stability and breadth of
a stylized IEA) of enriching the standard model by introducing countries’ aversion to
environmental losses together with a concern for exceeding a so-called tipping
point, i.e. a critical level of admissible damages beyond which disastrous
consequences are expected. We refer to these preferences as threshold concerns,
and note that one can recover the standard model without loss aversion by setting
one parameter equal to zero, as discussed on page eight.
For tractability reasons, in Section 2 we abstract from such asymmetries in
exposure to the damages arising from high concentrations of pollutants, and assume
that countries are symmetric and uniformly perceive the threshold for catastrophic
damages, given by T. Introducing uncertainty on the location of the threshold can
destabilize coordination by reverting the game to a prisoner’s dilemma (Barrett
2013). The related experimental literature on the provision of discrete public goods
subject to thresholds corroborates this result. It has been shown that both
asymmetries among players as well uncertainty about the location of the threshold
hinder group achievement as measured by the likelihood of avoidance of the
dangerous equilibrium where catastrophic losses obtain (Tavoni et al., 2011;
Dannenberg et al., 2015). On the other hand, leadership appears to be an important
engine of collective action, as successful experimental groups tend to eliminate
inequality over the course of the game. In these, rich players signal willingness to
redistribute their funds early on in the game (Tavoni et al., 2011). Related studies
confirm the importance of leadership (Bosetti et al., 2015; Dietz et al., 2012; İriş et
al., 2015), especially on the part of wealthy actors (Vasconcelos et al., 2014).
We can thus view the theoretical model presented here as an initial step in
introducing realistic features in the standard coalition formation model of
international environmental agreements. We anticipate that the symmetry and
common knowledge assumptions utilized in Section 2 are likely to bias upwards the
transformative potential of the threshold in fostering cooperation. We check for this
effect in Section 3, which extends the model by introducing some degree of
asymmetry in countries’ threshold concerns. More specifically, we extend the model
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to allow countries to have different beliefs on the environmentally tolerable level of
pollution, by letting a fraction of the countries believe that the critical threshold is
higher than the one perceived by the remaining countries.2
In ecological processes, threshold uncertainty is often irreducible; nevertheless,
scientists often attach probabilities to different future environmental scenarios. For
example, the 2013 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Summary for
Policymakers (IPCC, 2013) states that: “There is high conﬁdence that sustained
warming greater than some threshold would lead to the near-complete loss of the
Greenland ice sheet over a millennium or more, causing a global mean sea level rise
of up to 7 m. Current estimates indicate that the threshold is greater than about 1°C
(low conﬁdence) but less than about 4°C (medium conﬁdence) global mean
warming with respect to pre-industrial”. Hence, early warning signals, if picked up
and correctly processed in time, may act as stimuli for action on environmental
protection.
We investigate theoretically this hypothesis by introducing aversion to losses in
excess of the given threshold T, which can be viewed as reflecting the scientific or
political consensus on what level of environmental damage is deemed tolerable. In
the case of climate change, where unsafe levels of warming (e.g. 4°C) have been
linked to damages (e.g. loss of the Greenland ice sheet), one can also interpret T in
terms of temperature change generally associated with catastrophic climate change.
That is, levels of warming beyond which environmental damages increase abruptly
and are subject to irreversibility. As mentioned above, we do away with the
complexities arising from uncertainty over the threshold level. Under this optimistic
scenario where no uncertainty muddles the value of the safe pollution level, we ask
whether the traditionally negative prediction of either small or ineffective

2

The current paper contributes to the literature, which study the implications country
asymmetries on IEAs. Kolstad (2010) examines countries’ asymmetries in their size and
marginal damage from pollution; McGinty (2007) and Pavlova and de Zeeuw (2013) in their
marginal costs and benefits of abatement; and Mendez and Trelles (2000) in their
technologies.
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international environmental agreements can be reverted (Barrett, 1994; Carraro
and Siniscalco, 1993).
Under symmetric threshold concerns, we show that the form of loss-aversion we
used has a positive effect on reducing the emission levels of both signatories and
non-signatories, leading to higher global welfare and in some cases to a larger
coalition. Therefore, countries are more likely to take on significant environmental
commitments when they believe they face the threat of an impending
environmental catastrophe.
Under asymmetric threshold concerns, stable coalitions are mostly formed by the
countries with higher threshold concern. The size of the coalition diminishes when
enough countries lack a concern for overstepping the threshold, regardless of the
preferences of the other countries (whether they have strong or mild threshold
concerns). Unlike in the symmetric setup, where the stable coalitions are always
unique, under asymmetry uniqueness is not guaranteed: in some cases a coalition
may not form, in others more than one stable coalition can materialize.
Our model closely follows Diamantoudi Sartzetakis (2006), DS henceforth. In
Section 2 we introduce the basic notions of the model under the assumption that
countries are symmetric. In Subsection 2.1 we study two benchmark cases, the
games associated with non-cooperative behavior and full cooperative behavior. In
Subsection 2.2 we introduce the coalition formation game, which consists of nonsignatory behavior, signatory behavior, and the stability analysis (to determine the
size of the stable IEA). In Section 3, we extend the model by allowing different
countries to have differing degrees of aversion to environmental losses.

2. Symmetric Model
We consider a regional or global pollution game involving 𝑛 identical countries,
𝑁 = {1, 2, … , 𝑛}. Production and consumption in each country 𝑖 generates emissions
𝑒𝑖 of a transnational pollutant. Pollution is a public bad, that is, each country’s
emission not only damages itself, but also damages the other countries in equal
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measure, thus imposing a negative externality on others. We assume that each
country 𝑖 simultaneously decides its non-negative emission level, 𝑒𝑖 ≥ 0. 3 By this
assumption, we exclude the possibility of an existing stock of pollution that can be
diminished through abatement efforts. The standard social welfare of country 𝑖 is
the difference between 𝑖’s benefits from emissions 𝐵𝑖 (𝑒𝑖 ) due to production and
consumption and the transboundary environmental damages 𝐷𝑖 (𝐸) from the
aggregate emissions, 𝐸 = ∑𝑛𝑖 𝑒𝑖 . We use the following quadratic functional forms for
the benefit and damage functions:
1

𝐵𝑖 (𝑒𝑖 ) = 𝛽𝑒𝑖 − 2 𝑒𝑖2 , and

𝛾

𝐷𝑖 (𝐸) = 2 𝐸 2 ,

(1)

where 𝛽 and 𝛾 are positive.
In addition to the standard calculus outlined above, we assume that each country 𝑖
has concerns on the level of the environmental damages and whether it exceeds a
critical threshold 𝑇 ≥ 0 representing the environmentally safe operating limit.4 If
the level of environmental damages does not exceed the threshold, i.e. 𝐷𝑖 (𝐸) ≤ 𝑇,
then each country 𝑖 enjoys being in safe territory. If the level of environmental
damages exceeds the threshold, 𝐷𝑖 (𝐸) > 𝑇, then each country’s welfare drops due to
the threat of an environmental catastrophe. Specifically, we assume that
governments are averse to environmental losses, i.e. they have a stronger tendency
to avoid the environmental losses generated by large emissions than acquiring gains
(through increased emissions). The environmental gain-loss function of country 𝑖 is
written as follows:
𝐺𝐿𝑖 (𝐸, 𝑇) = {

𝑇 − 𝐷𝑖 (𝐸), 𝐷𝑖 (𝐸) ≤ 𝑇
𝜆(𝑇 − 𝐷𝑖 (𝐸)), 𝐷𝑖 (𝐸) > 𝑇

(2)

3

Instead of emissions, abatement effort could be used as the choice variable - see for
instance Barrett (1994). DS show that the two choices are strategically equivalent.
4 The extension in Section 3 captures countries’ asymmetry on the perception of
environmentally safe operating limit.
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for 𝜆 > 1, known as loss-aversion parameter.5 The social welfare of loss-averse
country 𝑖 depends

on

its

own

emissions

as

well

as

on

the

others’

𝑒−𝑖 = {𝑒1 , … , 𝑒𝑖−1 , 𝑒𝑖+1 , … , 𝑒𝑛 }, in addition to depending on the threshold for the
environmentally safe operating limit 𝑇:
𝛾

𝑤𝑖 (𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒−𝑖 , 𝑇) = 𝛽𝑒𝑖 −

1

𝑒2
2 𝑖

𝛾

− 2 (𝐸

)2

𝑇 − 2 (𝐸 )2 ,

𝛾
2

+𝛼{
𝛾
𝜆 (𝑇 − 2 (𝐸 )2 ) ,

(𝐸 )2 ≤ 𝑇
𝛾

(𝐸 )2 > 𝑇
2

(3)

where α is a positive scaling factor, determining the degree to which country 𝑖 cares
about the environmental gain-loss function. For convenience, we focus our analysis
on the case in which the level of environmental damages exceeds the safe operating
limit (loss domain), that is:
1
𝛾
𝛾
𝑤𝑖 (𝑒𝑖 , 𝐸, 𝑇) = 𝛽𝑒𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖2 − (𝐸 )2 + 𝛼𝜆 (𝑇 − (𝐸 )2 )
2
2
2
1

𝛾

= 𝛽𝑒𝑖 − 2 𝑒𝑖2 − 2 𝐿(𝐸 )2 + (𝐿 − 1)𝑇

(4)

where 𝐿 = (1 + 𝛼𝜆) captures threshold concerns, that is, both the degree to which
governments care about the environmental gain-loss function (𝛼) and the level of
aversion to environmental losses (𝜆). The results for the case in which the level of
environmental damages does not exceed 𝑇 can be derived by simply equating 𝜆 = 1,
implying 𝐿 = (1 + 𝛼) (gain domain). Similarly, the results for the neutral case can be
derived by equating 𝛼 = 0, which implies 𝐿 = 1 (neutral domain). Note that this
analysis is possible, since the critical threshold 𝑇 disappears once the first-order
condition is taken. Thus, within any of these domains, the threshold only levies the
social welfare level but not the chosen emission levels.
2.1. Two Benchmark Cases: The Non-cooperative and Full Cooperation Cases
The non-cooperative case relies on the standard Cournot/Nash equilibrium in which
countries pursue their unilateral strategies. Given the emission levels of the other
countries, each country chooses its emission level to maximize the social welfare
5

This well-known formulation is a local definition of loss aversion by Kobberling and
Wakker (2005)
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function described in (4). In order to derive the equilibrium emission level, first we
find the best-response function by taking the first-order condition of the
maximization problem and equating to zero, 𝜕𝑤𝑖 (. )⁄𝜕𝑒𝑖 = 0,6
𝑒𝑖 (∑𝑗≠𝑖 𝑒𝑗 ) =

𝛽−𝛾𝐿(∑𝑗≠𝑖 𝑒𝑗 )
1+𝛾𝐿

.

(5)

Under symmetry, all countries emit the same in equilibrium. Substituting the
emission level of all countries by the non-cooperative emission level, 𝑒𝑛𝑐 , yields the
non-cooperative equilibrium emission level: 𝑒𝑛𝑐 =

𝛽
1+𝑛𝛾𝐿

. Observe that the non-

cooperative emissions decrease in countries’ threshold concerns.
In the full cooperation case, all countries choose how much to emit jointly to
maximize their aggregate social welfare function, 𝑤 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 . The solution of the
maximization problem is found by 𝜕𝑤(. )⁄𝜕𝑒𝑖 = 0. The full cooperative outcome
𝛽

yields the following per country emission level, 𝑒𝑐 = 1+𝑛2 𝛾𝐿. Cooperative emissions
also decrease in countries’ threshold concerns.
2.2. Partial Cooperation
The coalition formation game consists of three stages that are solved
simultaneously, assuming that countries can look forward and infer backwards.
Stage 1 is a participation game in which each country chooses simultaneously to be
either a signatory or a non-signatory to a stylized IEA. Stages 2 and 3 entail a
Stackelberg game with signatories playing the role of leaders. More specifically, the
signatories decide jointly their emission level in Stage 2, followed by non-signatory
countries independently deciding their emission levels in Stage 3. The game is
solved using backward induction.
A set of countries 𝑆 ⊂ 𝑁 signs an agreement, while the remaining N\S countries do
not. The coalition, formed by |𝑆| = 𝑠 signatories, generates emissions 𝐸𝑠 , with each

6

To increase readability, we avoid significant amount of simple but tedious calculations in
the paper. Nevertheless, we can provide a Mathematica supporting file for these
calculations upon request, in either pdf or nb format.
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member emitting 𝑒𝑠 such that 𝐸𝑠 = 𝑠𝑒𝑠 . Each non-signatory emits 𝑒𝑛𝑠 so that nonsignatories collectively emit 𝐸𝑛𝑠 = (𝑛 − 𝑠)𝑒𝑛𝑠 .
The non-signatory countries are thus the Stackelberg followers, i.e. they observe the
actions of the signatories, and then act non-cooperatively given the emission level of
the leaders and other non-signatory countries. The behavior of non-signatories is
described by the same best-response function as in the non-cooperative model (5).
Since, by symmetry, all non-signatory countries emit the same level in equilibrium,
𝑒𝑛𝑠 , the other countries, except non-signatory 𝑖, emit jointly (𝑛 − 𝑠 − 1)𝑒𝑛𝑠 + 𝑠𝑒𝑠 ,
yielding the best-response function depending on signatories’ emission level:
𝑒𝑛𝑠 (𝑒𝑠 ) =

𝛽−𝛾𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑠

(6)

𝑋

where 𝑋 = 1 + 𝛾𝐿(𝑛 − 𝑠). Signatories are the Stackelberg leaders, i.e. they know
how the non-signatory countries best respond to their emission levels, and so they
take it into account and act cooperatively with the other signatory countries. More
formally, they maximize the objective function, 𝑤 𝑆 = ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑤𝑖 , by solving
𝜕𝑤 𝑆 (. )⁄𝜕𝑒𝑠 = 0, subject to the best response function 𝑒𝑛𝑠 (𝑒𝑠 ) in (6). The emission
level of a signatory is,
𝑒𝑠 = 𝛽 (1 −

𝛾𝐿𝑛𝑠
Ψ

),

(7)

where Ψ = 𝛾𝑠 2 𝐿 + 𝑋 2 . Substituting signatory countries’ emission level (7) into the
non-signatory’s best response function (6) gives the emission level of a nonsignatory:
𝑒𝑛𝑠 = 𝛽 (1 −

𝛾𝐿𝑛𝑋
Ψ

) = 𝑒𝑠 +

𝛽𝛾𝐿𝑛(𝑠−𝑋)
Ψ

.

(8)
𝑠−1

Note that 𝑠 > 𝑋 should hold for 𝑒𝑛𝑠 > 𝑒𝑠 , which is equivalent to 𝛾 < (𝑛−𝑠)𝐿 .
Moreover, the aggregate emission level of all countries simplifies to the following:
𝐸 = 𝐸𝑠 + 𝐸𝑛𝑠 = 𝑠𝑒𝑠 + (𝑛 − 𝑠)𝑒𝑛𝑠 =

𝛽𝑛𝑋
Ψ

.

(9)
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We need to guarantee the signatory and non-signatory countries’ emission levels to
be positive, which is satisfied by the conditions below:7
4

4

𝑒𝑠 > 0 ⇒ 𝛾 < 𝑛 𝐿 (𝑛−4) for 𝑛 > 4; 𝑒𝑛𝑠 > 0 ⇒ 𝛾 < 𝑛 𝐿 (𝑛−4) for 𝑛 > 4
These conditions require the relative impact of damages to benefits to be not very
high. Having non-trivial threshold concerns (that is, departing from the standard
model of loss neutrality, with 𝐿 > 1) additionally requires the relative impact of
damages to be smaller. DS find a very similar condition without the threshold
concerns 𝐿. As they point out, this apparently harmless condition is essential and
restricts the size of the stable coalition to be 2, 3, or 4.
Next, we obtain the indirect social welfare functions of signatory countries 𝜔𝑠 and
non-signatory countries 𝜔𝑛𝑠 by substituting the relevant emission levels of the
signatories and the non-signatories and aggregate emissions (7-9) into the social
welfare function:
1

𝜔𝑠 = 𝛽 2 (2 −

𝛾𝐿𝑛2
2Ψ

1

) + (𝐿 − 1)𝑇, and 𝜔𝑛𝑠 = 𝛽 2 (2 −

𝛾𝐿(1+𝛾𝐿)𝑛2 𝑋 2
2Ψ2

) + (𝐿 − 1)𝑇 (10)

The following Lemma, similar to proposition 2 in DS, defines the properties of
indirect welfare functions.
Lemma 2: Consider the indirect welfare functions of signatory and non-signatory
countries, 𝜔𝑠 and 𝜔𝑛𝑠 , respectively, and let 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 =

1+𝛾𝐿𝑛
1+𝛾𝐿

. Then,

i.

𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠∈ℝ∩[0,𝑛] 𝜔𝑠 ;

ii.

𝜔𝑠 (𝑠) increases in 𝑠 if 𝑠 > 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 and it decreases in s if 𝑠 < 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ;

iii.

𝜔𝑛𝑠 (𝑠) > (<)𝜔𝑠 (𝑠) for all 𝑠 > (<)𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 .

iv.

If, moreover, 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 is integer, then the two indirect welfare levels are equal at
𝑠 = 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 , that is, 𝜔𝑛𝑠 (𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ) = 𝜔𝑠 (𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ).

Lemma 2 shows that a country is better off as a signatory when the size of the
coalition is small, and that its welfare decreases as the size of the coalition increases.

7

The proof of this condition and all other proofs are in the appendix.

11

Next, we discuss the impact of governments’ threshold concerns on the welfare
functions.
Proposition 1: Let 𝐿′′ > 𝐿′, then
i.

𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐿′′) > 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐿′).

ii.

There

exist

some 𝑠̃ ∈ (𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐿′), 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐿′′)) such

that 𝜔𝑠 (𝑠, 𝐿)|𝑠=𝑠̃ ,𝐿=𝐿′

increases in s since 𝑠̃ > 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐿′) and 𝜔𝑠 (𝑠, 𝐿)|𝑠=𝑠̃,𝐿=𝐿′′ decreases in s since
𝑠̃ < 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐿′′). For

any

other 𝑠 ∉ (𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐿′), 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐿′′)) ,

if 𝜔𝑠 (𝑠, 𝐿)|𝐿=𝐿′

decreases (increases), 𝜔𝑠 (𝑠, 𝐿)|𝐿=𝐿′′ decreases (increases) as well.
iii.

For some 𝑠̃ ∈ (𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐿′), 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐿′′)), 𝜔𝑛𝑠 (𝑠, 𝐿)|𝑠=𝑠̃ ,𝐿=𝐿′ > 𝜔𝑠 (𝑠, 𝐿)|𝑠=𝑠̃ ,𝐿=𝐿′ and
𝜔𝑛𝑠 (𝑠, 𝐿)|𝑠=𝑠̃,𝐿=𝐿′′ < 𝜔𝑠 (𝑠, 𝐿)|𝑠=𝑠̃,𝐿=𝐿′′ .

The main finding of Proposition 1 is that there are some coalition sizes such that a
country would be better off as a non-signatory when the threshold concerns are
relatively low. However, for the same coalition sizes, a country would be better off
as a signatory when countries’ threshold concerns are relatively high.
2.2.1. Stable Coalition
We have already found the emission levels of signatory and non-signatory countries
in Stages 2 and 3. We now solve the participation game in Stage 1, to determine the
number of signatories 𝑠 ∗ in a stable coalition. A coalition is stable if it satisfies
internal and external stability conditions, which guarantee that the agreement is
self-enforcing. The conditions are, respectively:
𝜔𝑠 (𝑠 ∗ ) ≥ 𝜔𝑛𝑠 (𝑠 ∗ − 1) and 𝜔𝑠 (𝑠 ∗ + 1) ≤ 𝜔𝑛𝑠 (𝑠 ∗ ).

(11)

The internal stability condition guarantees that a signatory country cannot be better
off by unilaterally leaving the coalition. Similarly, the external stability condition
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guarantees that a non-signatory country cannot be better off by unilaterally joining
the coalition.8
The existence and uniqueness of a stable coalition for the social welfare functions
with the additional gain-loss function follows DS’s Proposition 3. More specifically,
as DS show, for 𝑛 > 4, there exists a unique stable coalition whose size is
𝑠 ∗ ∈ {2,3,4}. Next, we analyze how a change in countries’ threshold concerns affects
the stable coalition size.
Proposition 2: For 𝑛 > 4, 𝜕𝑠 ∗ ⁄𝜕𝐿 ≥ 0.
We are going to illustrate the findings of Proposition 2 with a numerical example in
which the size of the stable coalition increases from 2 to 3. In this example, we
assume 𝑛 = 10, 𝛽 = 5/3, 𝛾 = 0.01, and 𝐿(= 1 + 𝛼𝜆) ≤ 1.5, which guarantees the
4
condition for positive emissions to hold: If 𝛾 < 𝑛 𝐿 (𝑛−4) ⇔ 0.01 < 0.044̅.

Figure 1 depicts the case when governments do not exhibit concerns for dangerous
climate change beyond a tipping point, 𝐿 = 1; Figure 2 focuses instead on countries
with some degree of threshold concern: we set 𝐿 = 1.5 for visual clarity.9 While 𝑇
does not play any role in Figure 1, it is set to be 1 in Figure 2, which leads countries
to be in the loss domain.10 In both figures, the indirect welfare function 𝜔𝑠 (𝑠) is
represented by the solid curve, 𝜔𝑛𝑠 (𝑠) by the dotted curve, and 𝜔𝑛𝑠 (𝑠 − 1) by the
dashed curve. All the indirect welfare functions are depicted against the size of
coalitions 𝑠, and here the range is restricted to the values of interest, 𝑠 = 1, … , 4.

8

The conditions (11) are first used for cartel stability by D’Aspremont et al. (1983), then
adapted to international public goods cooperation by Barrett (1992a, 1994), Hoel (1992a),
and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993).
9 In this numerical example, it is sufficient to set 𝐿 ≥ 1.02551 for the coalition size to
increase from 2 to 3. This also means that countries relatively small threshold concerns,
𝐿 ∈ (1, 1.02551), does not increase the coalition size, e.g., in a scenario in which countries
are in the gain domain. But it increases to 3 due to countries belief about the location of the
threshold decreases and, thus, more binding.
10 Remember that 𝑇 does not affect the emission levels. It does levy the welfare level, but in
equal measure for all welfare functions 𝜔𝑠 (𝑠), 𝜔𝑛𝑠 (𝑠), and, 𝜔𝑛𝑠 (𝑠 − 1). Thus, the size of the
coalition does not depend on 𝑇 so long as countries remain in the same domain (gain, loss
or neutrality).
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In Figure 1, one can observe that coalition size 𝑠 ∗ = 2 is internally stable,
𝜔𝑠 (𝑠 ∗ ) ≥ 𝜔𝑛𝑠 (𝑠 ∗ − 1), since the solid curve is above the dashed curve at 𝑠 = 2. Note
also that these two curves intersect at 𝑠 = 2.976, so 𝑠 = 3 is not internally stable.
Moreover, coalition size 𝑠 ∗ = 2 is also externally stable, 𝜔𝑠 (𝑠 ∗ + 1) ≤ 𝜔𝑛𝑠 (𝑠 ∗ ), since
the dotted curve is above the dashed curve at 𝑠 = 3. Therefore, the coalition size
𝑠 ∗ = 2 is stable.
In Figure 2 one can follow similar arguments and observe that coalition size 𝑠 ∗ = 3
is both internally and externally stable. Therefore, the stable coalition size weakly
increases as threshold concerns are introduced (or concerns become stronger),
when the environmentally safe operating limits are exceeded.

Figure 1: Coalition Size without Threshold Concerns
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Figure 2: Coalition Size with Threshold Concerns

3. Asymmetric Model
In this section we consider the case when, out of 𝑛 countries, ℎ have a high concern
for exceeding the threshold and 𝑛 − ℎ have low threshold concerns: 𝐿ℎ = 1 +
𝛼ℎ 𝜆ℎ > 𝐿𝑙 = 1 + 𝛼𝑙 𝜆𝑙 . Alternatively, one can interpret this as ℎ countries having low
and 𝑛 − ℎ countries having high environmentally safe operating limits 𝑇𝑙 ≤ 𝑇ℎ . Thus,
ℎ countries are in the loss domain and 𝑛 − ℎ countries are either in the gain or
neutral domain.
3.1. Two Benchmark Cases: The Non-cooperative and Full Cooperation Cases
Similar to the symmetric case, in the non-cooperative case countries maximize their
welfare, according to (4). However, the problem for country 𝑖 differs depending on
the degree of concern, as follows:
1 2 𝛾
𝑤ℎ𝑖 (𝑒ℎ𝑖 , 𝐸, 𝑇) = 𝛽𝑒ℎ𝑖 − 𝑒ℎ𝑖
− 𝐿ℎ (𝑒ℎ𝑖 + (ℎ − 1)𝑒ℎ + (𝑛 − ℎ)𝑒𝑙 )2 + (𝐿ℎ − 1)𝑇
2
2
1

𝛾

𝑤𝑙𝑖 (𝑒𝑙𝑖 , 𝐸, 𝑇) = 𝛽𝑒𝑙𝑖 − 2 𝑒𝑙𝑖2 − 2 𝐿ℎ (𝑒𝑙𝑖 + ℎ𝑒ℎ + (𝑛 − ℎ − 1)𝑒𝑙 )2 + (𝐿𝑙 − 1)𝑇

(12)
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Where 𝑒ℎ𝑖 and 𝑒𝑙𝑖 are the emission levels of country 𝑖, and 𝑒ℎ and 𝑒𝑙 are any other
country’s emission levels with high and low threshold concerns. The FOCs,
𝜕𝑤ℎ𝑖 (. )⁄𝜕𝑒ℎ𝑖 = 0 and 𝜕𝑤𝑙𝑖 (. )⁄𝜕𝑒𝑙𝑖 = 0, give the best-response functions for a
country with high and low threshold concerns, respectively:
𝑒ℎ𝑖 ((ℎ − 1)𝑒ℎ + (𝑛 − ℎ)𝑒𝑙 ) =
𝑒𝑙𝑖 (ℎ𝑒ℎ + (𝑛 − ℎ − 1)𝑒𝑙 ) =

𝛽−𝛾𝐿ℎ ((ℎ−1)𝑒ℎ +(𝑛−ℎ)𝑒𝑙 )
1+𝛾𝐿ℎ

𝛽−𝛾𝐿𝑙 (ℎ𝑒ℎ +(𝑛−ℎ−1)𝑒𝑙 )

(13)

1+𝛾𝐿𝑙

In equilibrium, countries with the same level of threshold concerns emit the same,
that is 𝑒ℎ𝑖 = 𝑒ℎ and 𝑒𝑙𝑖 = 𝑒𝑙 . Thus, the best-response functions for any country with
high and low threshold concerns are:
𝑒ℎ ((𝑛 − ℎ)𝑒𝑙 ) =

𝛽−𝛾𝐿ℎ (𝑛−ℎ)𝑒𝑙
1+𝛾ℎ𝐿ℎ

and

𝛽−𝛾𝐿 ℎ𝑒

𝑙
ℎ
𝑒𝑙 (ℎ𝑒ℎ ) = 1+𝛾𝐿 (𝑛−ℎ)
𝑙

(14)

Substituting one into the other gives the non-cooperative equilibrium emissions:
1−𝛾(𝑛−ℎ)(𝐿ℎ −𝐿𝑙 )
)
ℎ +(𝑛−ℎ)𝐿𝑙 )

𝑒ℎ𝑛𝑐 = 𝛽 (1+𝛾(ℎ𝐿

and

1+𝛾ℎ(𝐿ℎ −𝐿𝑙 )

𝑒𝑙𝑛𝑐 = 𝛽 (1+𝛾(ℎ𝐿

ℎ +(𝑛−ℎ)𝐿𝑙 )

)

(15)

Notice that the denominators of both emission levels are the same. Then, it is
straightforward to observe that countries with high threshold concerns emit less
than the ones with low threshold concerns in the non-cooperative solution:
𝑒ℎ𝑛𝑐 < 𝑒𝑙𝑛𝑐 . Furthermore, 𝛾 < (𝐿

1
ℎ −𝐿𝑙 )(𝑛−ℎ)

should hold for 𝑒ℎ𝑛𝑐 > 0.

In the full cooperation case, both types of countries jointly decide their emission
levels to maximize their aggregate social welfare function, 𝑤 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 . The solution
of the maximization problem is found by setting 𝜕𝑤(. )⁄𝜕𝑒ℎ = 0 and 𝜕𝑤(. )⁄𝜕𝑒𝑙 = 0,
and substituting one into the other. This yields the same emission levels for both
types of countries:
𝑒ℎ𝑐 = 𝑒𝑙𝑐 = 1+𝛾𝑛(ℎ𝐿

𝛽
ℎ +(𝑛−ℎ)𝐿𝑙 )

(16)

3.2. Partial Cooperation
We are now going to study a similar coalition formation game to the one in section
2.2, by solving the asymmetric participation game so as to derive the number of
16

signatories. Both countries with high and low threshold concerns can now be
signatories to the treaty, and we denote them respectively by 𝑠ℎ and 𝑠𝑙 , with
𝑠 = 𝑠ℎ + 𝑠𝑙 . That means the numbers of non-signatories with high and low threshold
concerns are respectively ℎ − 𝑠ℎ and 𝑛 − ℎ − 𝑠𝑙 . The best-response function,
governing the behavior of non-signatory country 𝑖 with high threshold concerns, is
written as follows:
𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖 (𝑒𝑠ℎ , 𝑒𝑠𝑙 , 𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ , 𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑙 ) =

𝛽−𝛾𝐿ℎ ((𝑛−ℎ−𝑠𝑙 )𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑙 +(ℎ−𝑠ℎ −1)𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ +𝑠ℎ 𝑒𝑠ℎ +𝑠𝑙 𝑒𝑠𝑙 )
1+𝛾𝐿ℎ

(17)

where 𝑒𝑠ℎ , 𝑒𝑠𝑙 , 𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ and 𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑙 are emission levels of signatory and non-signatory
countries with high (𝐿ℎ ) and low (𝐿𝑙 ) threshold concerns, respectively. Since all nonsignatory countries with high threshold concerns have the best-response function in
(17), we set 𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖 = 𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ and find their best-response functions:
𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ (𝑒𝑠ℎ , 𝑒𝑠𝑙 , 𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑙 ) =

𝛽−𝛾𝐿ℎ ((𝑛−ℎ−𝑠𝑙 )𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑙 +𝑠ℎ 𝑒𝑠ℎ +𝑠𝑙 𝑒𝑠𝑙 )
1+𝛾𝐿ℎ (ℎ−𝑠ℎ )

(18)

One can follow the same steps for non-signatories with low threshold concerns, and
find the following best-response function:
𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑙 (𝑒𝑠ℎ , 𝑒𝑠𝑙 , 𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ ) =

𝛽−𝛾𝐿𝑙 ((ℎ−𝑠ℎ )𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ +𝑠ℎ 𝑒𝑠ℎ +𝑠𝑙 𝑒𝑠𝑙 )
1+𝛾𝐿𝑙 (𝑛−ℎ−𝑠𝑙 )

(19)

Since all non-signatories simultaneously decide their emission levels after observing
the emission levels of the signatories, we substitute one into the other and find the
best-response functions for non-signatories with high and low threshold concerns,
depending on the emissions of the signatories only:
𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ (𝑒𝑠ℎ , 𝑒𝑠𝑙 ) =

𝛽−𝛾𝐿ℎ (𝑠ℎ 𝑒𝑠ℎ +𝑠𝑙 𝑒𝑠𝑙 )−𝛽𝛾(𝑛−ℎ−𝑠𝑙 )(𝐿ℎ −𝐿𝑙 )

𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑙 (𝑒𝑠ℎ , 𝑒𝑠𝑙 ) =

𝑌

(20)

𝛽−𝛾𝐿𝑙 (𝑠ℎ 𝑒𝑠ℎ +𝑠𝑙 𝑒𝑠𝑙 )−𝛽𝛾(ℎ−𝑠ℎ )(𝐿ℎ −𝐿𝑙 )
𝑌

where 𝑌 = 1 + 𝛾(𝐿ℎ (ℎ − 𝑠ℎ ) + 𝐿𝑙 (𝑛 − ℎ − 𝑠𝑙 )).
Signatories maximize their joint welfare function, 𝑤 𝑆 = ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑤𝑖 , which consists of
signatory countries with both high and low threshold concerns, subject to the bestresponse functions of non-signatories in (20). Integrating these best-response
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functions into the joint welfare and solving the problem by the FOCs
(𝜕𝑤 𝑆 (. )⁄𝜕𝑒𝑠ℎ = 0 and 𝜕𝑤 𝑆 (. )⁄𝜕𝑒𝑠𝑙 = 0), yields the emission levels of both types of
signatories. These depend on each other’s emission level, as follows:
𝑒𝑠ℎ (𝑒𝑠𝑙 ) =

𝛽𝑌 2 −𝛾(𝛽(𝑛−𝑠ℎ −𝑠𝑙 )+𝑠𝑙 𝑒𝑠𝑙 )(𝑠ℎ 𝐿ℎ +𝑠𝑙 𝐿𝑙 )
𝑌 2 +𝛾𝑠ℎ (𝑠ℎ 𝐿ℎ +𝑠𝑙 𝐿𝑙 )

𝑒𝑠𝑙 (𝑒𝑠ℎ ) =

𝛽𝑌 2 −𝛾(𝛽(𝑛−𝑠ℎ −𝑠𝑙 )+𝑠ℎ 𝑒𝑠ℎ )(𝑠ℎ 𝐿ℎ +𝑠𝑙 𝐿𝑙 )
𝑌 2 +𝛾𝑠ℎ (𝑠ℎ 𝐿ℎ +𝑠𝑙 𝐿𝑙 )

(21)

Since signatories decide their emission level simultaneously, we substitute one into
the other, which gives the emission levels of signatory countries with high and low
threshold concerns.
𝑒𝑠ℎ = 𝑒𝑠𝑙 =

𝛽(Ω−𝛾𝑛(𝑠ℎ 𝐿ℎ +𝑠𝑙 𝐿𝑙 ))

(22)

Ω

where Ω = 𝑌 2 + 𝛾(𝑠ℎ + 𝑠𝑙 )(𝑠ℎ 𝐿ℎ + 𝑠𝑙 𝐿𝑙 ) . Substituting (22) back into the nonsignatory countries’ best-response functions in (20) gives the emission level of nonsignatory countries with high and low threshold concerns, respectively:
𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ =

𝛽(Ω−𝛾𝐿ℎ 𝑛𝑌)
Ω

and

𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑙 =

𝛽(Ω−𝛾𝐿𝑙 𝑛𝑌)

(23)

Ω

Next, we find the aggregate emission level of all countries under the asymmetric
case 𝐸 𝐴 = 𝐸𝑠ℎ + 𝐸𝑠𝑙 + 𝐸𝑛𝑠ℎ + 𝐸𝑛𝑠𝑙 , which simplifies to the following expression:
𝐸 𝐴 = 𝑠ℎ 𝑒𝑠ℎ + 𝑠𝑙 𝑒𝑠𝑙 + (ℎ − 𝑠ℎ )𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ + (𝑛 − ℎ − 𝑠𝑙 )𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑙 =
Note

that 𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ < 𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑙 ,

𝛾 < (ℎ−𝑠

(𝑠ℎ −1)𝐿ℎ +𝑠𝑙 𝐿𝑙

as

expected.

𝛽𝑛𝑌

For 𝑒𝑠ℎ = 𝑒𝑠𝑙 < 𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ ,

we

need

1
ℎ 𝐿ℎ +𝑠𝑙 𝐿𝑙 )(𝑛−ℎ−𝑠𝑙 )

suffices

. Furthermore, the condition 𝛾 < (𝑠
𝐿

ℎ )𝐿ℎ +(𝑛−ℎ−𝑠𝑙 )𝐿ℎ 𝑙

(24)

Ω

for 𝑒𝑠ℎ = 𝑒𝑠𝑙 > 0 to hold. As in the symmetric case, all of these conditions require the
relative impact of damages to benefits to be not very high.
Lastly, we obtain the indirect social welfare functions of signatories and nonsignatories with high and low threshold concerns by substituting the relevant
emission levels from (22-23) into the social welfare function:
1

𝜔𝑠ℎ = 𝛽 2 (2 −

𝛾𝑛2 (𝑌 2 𝐿ℎ +𝛾(𝑠ℎ 𝐿ℎ +𝑠𝑙 𝐿𝑙 ))
2Ω2

) + (𝐿ℎ − 1)𝑇
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2 2
1 𝛾𝑛 (𝑌 𝐿𝑙 +𝛾(𝑠ℎ 𝐿ℎ +𝑠𝑙 𝐿𝑙 ))

𝜔𝑠𝑙 = 𝛽 2 (2

2Ω2

) + (𝐿𝑙 − 1)𝑇

(25)

1 𝛾𝑛2 𝑌 2 𝐿ℎ (1 + 𝛾𝐿ℎ )
𝜔𝑛𝑠ℎ = 𝛽 2 ( −
) + (𝐿ℎ − 1)𝑇
2
2Ω2
1 𝛾𝑛2 𝑌 2 𝐿𝑙 (1 + 𝛾𝐿𝑙 )
𝜔𝑛𝑠𝑙 = 𝛽 2 ( −
) + (𝐿𝑙 − 1)𝑇
2
2Ω2
3.3. Stability Analysis
In our asymmetric model, a coalition is stable if it satisfies internal and external
stability conditions for countries with high and low threshold concerns:
𝜔𝑠ℎ (𝑠ℎ∗ , 𝑠𝑙∗ , ℎ, 𝑛) ≥ 𝜔𝑛𝑠ℎ (𝑠ℎ∗ − 1, 𝑠𝑙∗ , ℎ, 𝑛), 𝜔𝑠ℎ (𝑠ℎ∗ + 1, 𝑠𝑙∗ , ℎ, 𝑛) ≤ 𝜔𝑛𝑠ℎ (𝑠ℎ∗ , 𝑠𝑙∗ , ℎ, 𝑛) (26)
𝜔𝑠𝑙 (𝑠ℎ∗ , 𝑠𝑙∗ , ℎ, 𝑛) ≥ 𝜔𝑛𝑠𝑙 (𝑠ℎ∗ , 𝑠𝑙∗ − 1, ℎ, 𝑛), 𝜔𝑠𝑙 (𝑠ℎ∗ , 𝑠𝑙∗ + 1, ℎ, 𝑛) ≤ 𝜔𝑛𝑠𝑙 (𝑠ℎ∗ , 𝑠𝑙∗ , ℎ, 𝑛) (27)
Due to the asymmetry, these conditions depend on the number of signatories of
either kind: 𝑠ℎ∗ and 𝑠𝑙∗ . This requires for all four conditions to be satisfied. For
instance, given a number of signatory countries with low threshold concerns 𝑠𝑙− , the
stable size of countries with high threshold can be 𝑠ℎ− . However, given 𝑠ℎ− , 𝑠𝑙− might
not be a stable size of countries with low threshold concerns. Moreover, these
conditions also depend on the number of countries with high (ℎ) and low (𝑛 − ℎ)
threshold concerns. Varying ℎ changes these conditions and what types of countries
form a stable coalition, as we show below.
In the following three tables, we present the results of our numerical analysis on the
stable number of signatories with different levels of threshold concerns. In each
table, the four rows show the number signatory countries with low threshold
concerns 𝑠𝑙 ∈ {0,1,2,3}. Similarly, the columns show the number signatory countries
with high threshold concerns 𝑠ℎ ∈ {0,1,2,3}. Columns are grouped for different
number of countries with high threshold concerns ℎ ∈ {0,1, … ,10}. The unfeasible
columns are omitted, since for any ℎ, we have 𝑠ℎ ≤ ℎ.
For each column, 𝑠ℎ equals to 0, 1, 2, or 3; the conditions in (27) provide a stable
number of signatories with low threshold concerns 𝑠𝑙∗ and we mark the respective
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cell with “𝑙”. Similarly, for each row, 𝑠𝑙 equals to 0, 1, 2, or 3, conditions in (26)
provide a stable number of signatories with high threshold concerns 𝑠ℎ∗ , and we
mark the respective cell with “ℎ”. If one cell contains both “h” and “l”, then it shows
how many signatories with high and low threshold concerns form this stable
coalition.
In this numerical example, we assume 𝑛 = 10, 𝛽 = 5/3, and 𝛾 = 0.03333333332.
The conditions on positive emissions and signatories emitting less than non-

signatories are satisfied, i.e. 0 < 𝑒𝑠ℎ = 𝑒𝑠𝑙 < 𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ < 𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑙 for all scenarios described
The following tables show the stability analysis for various asymmetric cases. Each table contains analysis
below. In any of these parts, we have kind of best responses for high and low types of countries. For instance, in T
Table 1: Stable Number of Signatories with High (𝑳𝒉 = 𝟐) and Low (𝑳𝒍 = 𝟏. 𝟓) Threshold Concerns

Table 1: Stable number of signatories in terms of high and low types (LA parameter)
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In Table 3, we assume that 𝐿ℎ = 1.1 and 𝐿𝑙 = 1. This is a scenario in which one type
of countries has mild threshold concerns, but the other has none. Note also that this
case has the weakest asymmetry between two types of countries, leading to the
following findings. First, compared to the case presented by Table 2, countries with
no threshold concerns (𝐿𝑙 = 1) have stronger incentives to participate, because
weaker asymmetry between types implies weaker external effects. Second, observe
again the multiplicity and potential non-existence of stable coalitions. We observe
the multiplicity of stable coalitions even if there is an equal number of countries
with high and low threshold concerns, ℎ = 𝑛 − ℎ = 5.
In sum, we observe that countries with higher threshold concern tend to form the
most of the coalitions. However, countries with low threshold concern may also join
the coalition if they are relatively high in number, i.e., for low ℎ’s. One type of
countries having no threshold concern could cause the coalition size to diminish,
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regardless of the other type of countries have strong or mild threshold concerns.
This can be also due to the decrease in countries’ aggregate threshold concerns.
Finally, a unique stable coalition always exists under symmetry. However, stable
coalitions may not exist or more than one stable coalition can exist once asymmetry
in the threshold concerns is introduced.

3. Discussion
We have studied the impact of loss-aversion and reference dependence on the
breadth and stability of an international environmental agreement aimed at abating
emissions in the presence of the threat of dangerous climate change. We model it as
a perceived tipping point, a threshold level of damages from emissions of pollutants
linked with industrial production, beyond which severe losses may be incurred. In
the symmetric case, which allows for greater analytical traction, we assume that
every country shares the same views on the entity of the threshold. Hence,
heterogeneity arises only with respect to the number of countries signing up to an
IEA in this setting. We then extend the model to allow for the more realistic case
where countries differ in their beliefs about the threshold for dangerous climate
change. Such differing views may originate from uncertainty about the location of
the threshold for dangerous climate change, or from the difficulty in translating a
given threshold into the effort required to avoid overstepping such boundary, as
argued in Barrett and Dannenberg (2012).
We have shown that loss aversion reduces global emission levels relative to the
standard model, leading to a higher global welfare both under full cooperation and
when countries act non-cooperatively. We have further established that, under
some conditions, loss aversion has a similar effect on the emission levels of
signatory and non-signatory countries negotiating an IEA, leading to higher global
welfare and in certain instances to a higher number of coalition members. We
conclude that loss-averse countries are more likely to take significant
environmental decisions on reducing their emissions, when their governments
believe that there is a credible threat of an approaching environmental catastrophe.
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The degree of departure between beliefs in different countries negotiating on
climate change abatement is of course an empirical matter. Here we abstract from
real world subtleties and assume, for the sake of tractability, either symmetric
behavior or a minimalistic level of heterogeneity with either high or low level of
concern for the environmental losses. Introducing asymmetric perceptions on the
presence and location of the tipping point (ideally backed by empirical evidence),
appears to be a fruitful avenue of extension of the stylized model we introduced
here, since significant part of the discussion in Paris meeting in 2015 revolved
around whether countries should collectively aim for 1.5℃ or 2℃ in global
warming.
A recent literature has developed to analyze the effect of tipping points on climate
change cooperation, some of which we have briefly reviewed here. We have added
to it by introducing a related behavioral aspect, loss aversion, a pervasive trait
among humans. Loss aversion is particularly salient for problems such as climate
change, which largely pertain to the loss domain, especially when contemplating the
damages arising from dangerous climate change. We hope that the simple model we
presented here will stimulate further research on this topic, which is interestingly
located at the nexus ofeconomics, behavior and ecology.
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Appendix:
The number of signatories s is a non-negative integer smaller than the number of
countries. In the proofs, we treat s as a real number in [0, 𝑛] and convert it to an
integer at the end whenever necessary.
Proof of the Condition for positive emissions:
𝛾𝐿𝑛𝑠

From equation (7), we have 𝑒𝑠 = 𝛽 (1 − 𝛾𝑠2 𝐿+𝑋 2). For 𝑒𝑠 > 0 , the following
condition should hold: 1 + 𝛾𝐿(𝑛 − 𝑠)(𝛾𝐿(𝑛 − 𝑠) − (𝑠 − 2)) > 0 . Let 𝐴(𝑠) = 1 +
𝛾𝐿(𝑛 − 𝑠)(𝛾𝐿(𝑛 − 𝑠) − (𝑠 − 2)) and 𝑠 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝐴(𝑠) =

2+n+2𝛾Ln
2(1+𝛾L)

. For 𝐴(𝑠) > 0 for

any 𝑠, it is sufficient to show that 𝐴(𝑠) > 0. One can easily find that 𝐴(𝑠) =
4−𝛾L(n−4)n
4(1+𝛾𝐿)

4

and for 𝐴(𝑠) > 0, we need 𝛾 < 𝑛 𝐿 (𝑛−4).

From equation (8), we have 𝑒𝑛𝑠 = 𝛽 (1 −

𝛾𝐿𝑛𝑋
Ψ

). For 𝑒𝑛𝑠 > 0, the following condition

hold: (1 + 𝛾𝐿(𝑛 − 𝑠) )(1 − 𝛾𝐿𝑠) + 𝛾𝐿𝑠 2 > 0 .

should

Let 𝛷(𝑠) = (1 + 𝛾𝐿(𝑛 −

2+𝛾𝐿𝑛

𝑠) )(1 − 𝛾𝐿𝑠) + 𝛾𝐿𝑠 2 and 𝑠 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝛷(𝑠) = 2(1+𝛾𝐿). For 𝛷(𝑠) > 0 for any s, it is
sufficient

to

show

2+𝛾Ln(2+𝛾L)

𝛷(𝑠) = (
have

2(1+𝛾𝐿)

2−𝛾2 𝐿2 𝑛
2(1+𝛾𝐿)

𝛷(𝑠) =

that

2−𝛾2 𝐿2 𝑛

𝛷(𝑠) > 0 .
𝛾𝐿(2+𝛾𝐿𝑛)2

) ( 2(1+𝛾𝐿) ) + (
1

2

4(1+𝛾𝐿)2

One

can

easily

find

that

) and for 𝛷(𝑠) > 0, it is sufficient to

4

1

2

> 0 ⇔ 𝛾 < 𝐿 √𝑛. Note that 𝑛 𝐿 (𝑛−4) < 𝐿 √𝑛 for 𝑛 ≥ 6. At 𝑛 = 5, we have

4+20𝛾L−25𝛾3 L3
4(1+𝛾𝐿)

and for 𝛷(𝑠) > 0 , the following condition should hold:
4

25𝛾 3 L3 − 20𝛾L − 4 < 0 and indeed holds for 𝛾 < 5𝐿. QED.
Proof of Lemma 2:
1) Let us first find 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 by taking partial derivative of signatory welfare function
w.r.t. number of signatories and equate to zero, which will simplify to the
following:
𝜕𝜔𝑠 (𝛽𝛾𝐿𝑛)2 (𝑠 − 𝑋)
=
=0
𝜕𝑠
Ψ2

28

For the equality to hold, we need 𝑠 = 𝑋, thus, 𝑠 = 1 + 𝛾𝐿(𝑛 − 𝑠). Solving for s gives,
𝑠 = 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 =

1+𝛾𝐿𝑛

. Since
1+𝛾𝐿

2) Observe that

𝜕𝜔𝑠
𝜕𝑠

𝜕 2 𝜔𝑠
𝜕𝑠2

> 0 for all 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝑛, the FOC is sufficient.

> (<)0 if 𝑠 > (<)𝑋 ⇔ 𝑠 > (<)𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 .

3) Using the indirect welfare functions, we can write 𝜔𝑛𝑠 in terms of 𝜔𝑠 :
𝜔𝑛𝑠 = 𝜔𝑠 +

(𝛽𝛾𝐿𝑛)2 (𝑠 − 𝑋)(𝑠 + 𝑋)
2Ψ2

It is straightforward to observe that 𝜔𝑛𝑠 ≶ 𝜔𝑠 , for 𝑠 ≶ 𝑋 ⇔ 𝑠 ≶ 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 .
4) Finally, if 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 is an integer, then for 𝑠 = 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ⇔ 𝑠 = 𝑋 and 𝜔𝑛𝑠 (𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ) =
𝜔𝑠 (𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ).
Proof of Proposition 2: Remember that ωs (z min ) = 𝜔ns (z min ). Let us define
z̅ = z min + 1 and let z′ be the smallest s such that ωs (z′) = ωns (z ′ − 1). DS show, in
the proof of Proposition 3, that z̅ < z ′ < z̅ + 1. Moreover, DS prove that if z ′ < 3,
then s∗ = 2, if z ′ < 4 then s ∗ = 3, and if z ′ ≥ 4, then s ∗ = 4. By the definition of z̅, we
can write the condition as z min + 1 < z ′ < z min + 2. It is then straightforward to
observe that for an increase in L, which increases z min , the size of the stable
coalition would weakly increase. QED.
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